Lacuna in Socially Foucault, Notes on Crossan, Demonology as Discourse on the Self

I've read Madness and Civilization a couple times and I'm discussing Foucault in my thesis. 


In a recent Acid Horizon podcast interview (will update when I determine which) they discuss a critical issue with Madness and & Civilization being Foucault's relative silence on demonic possession, demonology, and exorcism. 


(I encountered a parallel claim in Caliban and the Witch, Sylvia Federici, concerning the which trials.)


I'm not sure how accurate this is and wanted to get the opinion of others. I recall Foucault discussing artistic portrayal of mythical or dreamlike creatures as a touchstone for madness and unreason 


It strikes me that the distinction (of which seems to be put simplistically that unreason is outside reason while madness is a very broadly a perversion or alternatively appropriation of reason into acting like unreason and simultaneously a radicalization of reason against itself) between reason and unreason mirrors to some degree certain Christian cosmographic motifes (such as the working by Providence of evil acts into good ends, the fall of Lucifer allowing for Divine forces to triumph over him, the transubstantiation of the death of a God into victory over death). There's this intent angst of dualism trying to be monism between Providence on the one have, Good/Evil on the other, and on the gripping hand a desire or expectation for triumph by reversals, inversions, transcendence common both to the discourse of reason, unreason, and madness and Christian accounts of wars in heaven, Divine economy, temptation or corporation personified as a demonic campaign

 

demons though don't always behave like you expect an enemy would. in the case of the Galiean Possession, we see the demons operating at one level as a stand in for the Roman occupation (name of Legion, gets associated with swine, drown in the sea) but simultaneously distinctly demonic quite apart from being an enemy. they attempt to entreat Yeshua, they recognize him for what he is and worship him, which he commands them not to do and which isn't exactly a great endorsement for people to associate your Messiah with. they beg him for clemency, pointing out they will be homeless if they are sent out. it's not altogether clear that the demons enjoy their relationship to the occupied: they spend all day and night howling and crying and lacerating themselves with stones.


compare to how we see demons or one devil in particular in Jesus' temptation. I maintain that we are all living in those 40 days, that their conversation is generativity interpolating possible histories and cosmogonies as the Messiah and the Devil explore the madness of heat, hunger, cold, and thirst. when we invoke the devil as one already present tempting us to sin, whom we overcome by the grace of God intervening for us or allowing us to transcen, we place ourselves in the desert as the third party, the people to be saved alternatively by Christ's refusal or agreement to use the Devil's powers.


we see elsewhere that it is charged he does these things by Belzebul's power and in Belzebul's name, a charge enough widespread that it needed to be directly addressed in the propaganda circulating 70 years later. in the desert the equivalent is offered--the power to make food out of bread, which honestly doesn't sound to bad to a peasantry occupied and oppressed. likewise the power to be made king of the world and to evade natural causes of death: great things you would love your political agent to have and wield on your behalf. this temptation is cheapened somewhat if you assume Yeshua can already do all these things, and is just allowing his followers to remain oppressed out of--what, modesty? the need to map onto certain historical situations and limitations needs to be either elevated to transcendental or at least providential purposes or else place disheartening conceptual limits on the freedom and capacity of ones divine patron to act (on your behalf). to even acknowledge such limitations, indeed, may be rudeness to the point of blasphemy. but in that case, the negotiations to be struck up in composing how to talk about the Godhead begin to resemble somewhat the conversation in the desert, since in both the horror of sacrilege (in worshipping the devil in exchange for favors and the angst not to circumscribe God and this become delinquint of faith) is made to compete with the material needs of sustinence, the threat of oppression, and the fear of death. 


if the devil is tempting you, specifically, it is a microcosm of this general conflict and conflicts like it, all instances of worth are an interpolation of Jesus and the Devil or devils tempting him. a conversation with devils is always also a conversation with yourself, searching your feelings and memory and gut and guesswork on what you think devils are, what makes them evil and dangerous, what form they take. in this last case especially it is also a conversation with yourself about you, in that devils and delusions alike may speak in your own mental voice out of the screaming void event horizon which marks the internal limit of the self, that while we are capable of compartamentalizing ourselves as parallel processing modules talking to themselves and each other we aren't capable of definitively stating here i am because we only exist in self reference to ourselves. we are existentially indeterminate, or have the danger of becoming so, with or without a name or idea or context to ground us. 


tus the inevitablity that in conversing with demons we will converse with ourselves about demons and about ourselves and about such Gods or Dharma or train track Rules of Logic and the gameboard where we stand as They Play One Handed Games of Chess.

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Notes on The Galilean Possession

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In praise of litmus tests: kids in cages and The Cult of the Lesser Evil