Annotated Bibliography Zeta

Hadfield, Jo, et al. “Analysis of Accident and Emergency Doctors’ Responses to Treating People Who Self Harm.” Qualitative Health Research, Volume 19 No. 6, June 2009.

S: Hadfield used of interpretive phenomenological analysis (IPA) to understand how ER staff understand deliberate self harm. By extracting and collating the personal narratives, she found several major axes around which such meaning making turned, including agency narratives, feelings of hopelessness or manipulation, silencing patients, and empathy/infective insanity.

R: The text offers a model for the deployment of IPA and a material examples of liberal, Marxist, and neoliberal understandings of self harm, highly relevant to the second section of my thesis. The portion of the text dealing with alienation--the repetitive and futile nature of the staff’s work, atomization, classist/paternalistic attitudes which problematize economic realities (as opposed to psychological causes), and the division of social and psychological aetiology, and displacement of frustration--are especially promising, though the author fails to make that rather obvious connection.

Rosenhan, D. L. “Being Sane in Insane Places.” Science, Vol. 179. January 1973.

S. Rosenhan observed psych wards from within to complicate, if not outright refute, the possibility of an epistemology of mental illness by institutionalizing himself and seven other certifiably healthy participants on the basis of initial, fictionalized accounts of hallucinations. In addition to documenting institutional abuse and neglect, he draws attention to impossible burdens of proof & the entrenched stain of a diagnosis. He also at least gestures at an epistemic and political system which centers the experience of the mentally ill and patient-to-patient care.

R. Though the insight and potential for collective self-care on the part of the patients are alluded to, Rosenthal does not fully develop this potential or even draw up a path forward for doing so. More generally, he fails to locate the problems of stigma and powerlessness experienced by patients in the broader political context.

Crouch, William and John Wright. “Deliberative Self-Harm at an Adolescent Unit: A Qualitative Investigation.” Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry. SAGE Publications. (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi). Volume 9 no. 2. 2004.

S. Couch and Wright used Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) to understand the inter- and intra-social factors which contributed and contextualized deliberate self harm (DSH) in a British clinic for adolescent youth with mental health and substance abuse problems. Central to their results was the observation of a vicious ingroup/outgroup dynamic between those who authentically self harm and those who supposedly do so (only) for attention, such as by copying others. They recommend deconstructing the logic of withholding attention for self harm and helping individuals “own” the parts of themselves that desire self harm and/or attention. C.R. Schmidt’s friend/enemy distinction.

R. The notion of a split self by way of the emphasis on internal-integration and internalization of other patients is highly relevant to my section The Enemy of My Enemy for the ways in which cries for attention, contagion theory, self-regulation, etc. Even if the DuBois-ian two-ness notion doesn’t make a direct appearance, the effort to complicate the social context of self harm is highly appreciated.

McAllister, Margaret. “Multiple Meanings of Self Harm: A critical review.” International Journal of Mental Health Nursing, 2003.

S. This lit review highlights “multiple meanings of self harm, indicates that clinicians need to have multiple and flexible responses to clients, knowing that there are often many reasons for this behavior.” Key topic include labeling self harm/injury/suicide; the resurection of social factors; trauma, the repetition or implicit reveal thereof; learned self-hate, & object theory; and the dialectics of the body as a double discursive site (subject/object) (See Crowe 1996, Curry 1993).

R. This article provides further examples of the neoliberal/Marxist unified-dichotomy found in the psycho/social debates, as well as a psychoanalytic model of self harm-as-trauma-discourse. Most interesting, however, is the acknowledgement of self harm as what it presents itself as: self-hate and internal conflict. C.R. fear of this model present in Hadfield’s findings “The Enemy” section.

Rhodes, Robert I. "Comment on Marx's Epistemology." American Sociological Review 35, no. 5 (1970): 913-15. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2093303.

S. In this essay Rhodes pushes back on the dominant understanding of Marx’s epistemology as embodied in historical materialism. By performing a close reading of Marx’s first and third theses on Feuerbach, he argues that Marx’s “materialism,” though commonly understood as referring to material or concrete in the English sense (Earth against Heaven) would better be rendered as concerned with the real, being not a mere opposition, but transcension of Hegel’s Idealism (Earth up to Heaven). That is, unlike the French materialists and various Marxists (notably Engles and Lenin), Marx affirms that human consciousness and ideas are active forces upon history, being (in a Gramscian sense) co-elements of the mode of production.

R. This article provides historic and theoretical backing to my methodological intervention, namely the effort to configure Marxism as a dialectically comprehensive mode of analysis which includes an emphasis on individual interiority, rather than its own atomizing model of the subject as merely a node pulling on its web, as present in Millard.

Crowe, Michael and Jane Bunclark. “Repeated Self Injury and its management.” International

Review of Psychiatry. Vol. 12, Issue 1, February 2000.

S. Overview of frameworks of self harm and treatment models, including the ineffectiveness of “restriction” (Feldman 1988) and “prokaletic therapy” ( see Kraupl-Taylor 1969). This is followed by a description of the author’s own methods, which prioritize patient responsibility and risk taking. Crowe argues that it is necessary to tolerate some level of risk, otherwise the patient will develop no resilience to self-harm urges and will relapse at the first opportunity.

R. Having now read Kraupl-Taylor, I am skeptical as to Crowe’s understanding of and fairness towards the method, which if anything further develops the need to cultivate resilience in light of the socially-oriented, dialectical development of the self. Indeed, Crowe’s clinic could be seen as a paradigmatic neoliberal clinic, given its admission of the impossibility of directly policing the patient within and without the clinic and the need to develop resilience on the part of the patient, as if self-harm were no more than a character flaw or physiological addiction to be mastered and overcome.

Kräupl-Taylor, F. “Prokaletic Measures Derived from Psychoanalytic Technique.” British Journal of Psychiatry 115, no. 521 (1969): 407–19. doi:10.1192/bjp.115.521.407.

S. A fascinating and problematic description of the prokaletic (Greek: challenge) methods employed at Kräupl-Taylor’s Unit. Prokaletics as a method is (1) complex, (2) socially orientated, and (3) self-aware. (1) Much like reverse psychology, patients are frequently given challenging, psycho-sexual interpretations of their symptoms and pessimistic prognoses, paired with medication and ECT; if the challenge resonates with the patient (not dismissed blandly) they often rise to the occasion & (often temporarily) alter their behavior and condition. Initial improvements are actively avoided to prevent troubling early declines. (2) Success depends on the patient’s attachment to and respect for the doctor delivering the interpretation (probably for the interpertation’s believability/desire for continued residency) but often involves emotional pushback against the doctor. (3) Finally, the truth/falsity of these prognoses are problematized & the doctor’s are trying to incite challenges is not hidden or denied. The point isn’t necessarily whether the doctor actually believes it, but whether the statement resonates--i.e., frustrates the patient, signalling actual truth.

R. Though enmeshed in Freudian psycho-sexual fantasies, the social-dialectical model of care bears some resemblance to my own intervention in terms of understanding self harm itself in a more fully enmeshed social context. The mere re-enactment of trauma or play of suppressed fantasies, however, could too easily be mistaken for a model in which a false or perverted portion of the self disrupts the authentic, first-person experienced self, as opposed to a model which fully embraces internal multiplicity.

Millard C. A History of Self-Harm in Britain: A Fenology of Cutting and Overdosing. Basingstoke (UK): Palgrave Macmillan; 2015.

S. Millard’s book analyses of set of multi-layered shift that occurred in the post war period around self harm care, including: the (de)construction of the welfare state, the conceptions and morphology of “self harm,” the social- and chemical-models, and the neoliberal turn. Indeed, he makes a convincing argument that the history of the neoliberal turn, at least in terms of its ideological apparatus, can be understood through shifting standards in self harm. See especially the conclusion’s description of the ideological Triangle of “biomedicine,” “neoliberalism,” and “DSH-as-affective-regulation.”

R. Though a fascinating intervention with respect for the need for a socially enmeshed model of the patient, Millard’s text is a paradigmatic example of the failed Marxist break with atomized liberal subject, second only in my research to Fisher’s. It is also worth noting that, like modes of production and hegemony generally, the neoliberal shift in understanding has come unevenly to different regions and individuals. Indeed, my own experience and that reflected in Hadfield’s study suggests that neoliberal insights of endorphic-regulation and the self-policing patient still feel revolutionary and emancipatory precisely to those who remain enmeshed in a model of self-harm which seems to have barely progressed from the unintelligible, containment-centric notion of madness described in Madness and Civilization chapter 3, “The Insane” Foucualt.

Rosenthal, Susan. “Psychiatric Hegemony: A Marxist Theory of Mental Illness.” Mad In America.

S. A review of Psychiatric Hegemony: A Marxist Theory of Mental Illness, by Bruce Cohen, which follows the history of DSM-1 through -5 in order to demonstrate the dependency of neoliberal capitalism on psychiatry as a force to mold workers and pathologize dissent. Rosenthal endorses Cohen’s psychiatric abolitionism position, i.e. anti-coercive and -incarcerative powers, anti-drug, anti-ECT--which merely seeks to replace a technocratic, medical hierarchy with a social-reductionist, luddite one. However, she takes issue with his failure to outline a class-based strategy for this goal and for demonizing lower-level psychiatric workers en masse.

R. Though an interesting intervention in terms of the pathologizing of dissent (see my notes on the horror of normal) and intervention regarding psychiatric medicine-as-worker-management, this review triggered a frustration of mine (an internalized neoliberal bias?) regarding wholesale anti-pharmacuticalism, especially with the failure of nuance, epistemic grounding (be it scientific or embodied), and frankly immaturity on the part of the anti-psychiatric (and especially blanket anti-pharmaceutical) school. (The intervention reminds me of Zizek’s quip that rich countries should turn away refugees to highlight geopolitical inequalities--a future article, “Between Pragmatic Fatalism and Theory-Driven Fuckery”?)

Nelson, Maggie. The Argonauts. Greywolf Press, 2016.

S. Nelson’s text employs a looping, affective in medias res style to blur the lines between theory and memoir (“autotheory”). A meditation on the formation on identity and becoming, with a particular eye to family, queerness & heteronormativity, it defies efforts at summary. [For topic list see #thesis.]

R. At once all-pervading and profoundly fractured, The Argonauts offers a potential model for my own thesis, suggesting that if we have killed the author, then we have done so too early, not yet having attained the rites to cleanse our own blood from our hands, much less to grapple with our own self-negation. Or perhaps, that we have only succeded in killing the author in the most banal of ways, merely highlighting the deaths which occur every instant in order to make way for fresh daily and hourly be comings.

MacKinnon, Catharine A. "Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory."

Signs 7, no. 3 (1982): 515-44. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3173853.

S. In this essay, MacKinnon describes the parallel structures of Feminism & Marxism and examines various attempts to join them. She argues that these hybridization projects tend to sacrifice the central premises of one theory or the other, stripping it down to a gloss with which to make the other theory appear more capable and/or interested than it really is in resolving the independent (though intersecting) problems, as she sees them, of patriarchy and capitalism.

R. There’s a further parallel to alienation-from-the-essential in the feeling of being alienated from one’s body and selves in the case of mixed states, through forced immobility, drugs, alarmism. Also, Mackinnon is a good model for writing about the dynamics of subject formation, though her work does not seem to directly address the multiplicity of the self.

Gira Grant, Melissa. Playing the Whore. “Chapter 4: The Debate.” Verso Books, 2014.

S. Gira Grant unsettles the rhetorical framing of “the sex work debate,” noting that sex workers themselves are frequently excluded from the discourse and almost never permited to enter it on their own terms, but only as pieces of evidence for those arguing sex work must be escaped or regulated differently. The sources and architecture of the abnormality of sex work are never questioned: the framing is never, “what facors cause women to not engage in sex work” for example. Elsewhere in the text, she comments on her own position, as someone writing from but not about her personal exposure to sex work.

R. The exclusion of the sex worker parallels my own research, which overflows with psychiatrists, theorists, and occasional family members, but centers a glaring lack. When a person with a history of mental illness does write about their experience, it is usually framed in terms of a memoir; block quotations of the DSM are substituted for one’s own analysis of one’s own condition. I take inspiration from Gira Grant’s centering & unsettling, though I remain intensely ambivalent regarding the explicit disappearance of her own experience.

Anecdotally, in a recent conversation with a research librarian where I expressed frustration with the lack of self-authored psychiatric or mental health-political theory in their collection, I was told in absolute terms that I would not find any, such individuals being, by definition, incapable of producing such work at a scholarly level. Ironic: of my own most original theoretical insights, most occurred in the heights of crisis, or through reflections on the haphazard scrawl and of poetry, philosophy, fears and reliefs recorded during or immediately after such moments.

O’Grady, Peadar. “Stop Making Sense: Alienation and Mental Health.” Irish Marxist Review. Vol. 3, No. 11. 2014.

S. O’Grady offers the fairly standard Marxist history of mental illness: the rise of neoliberalism neurochemistry-model (commodity fetishism?) and the exclusion of social factors. Peculiar interventions include (1) the distinction between the nero-chemical model and biological models more generally (2), his focus on fear as the core of most mental illness (3) the focus on the problems of alienation (defined as loss of control) as a cause of mental suffering. He also emphasizes the need to materially eliminate disability as a socially constructed category.

R. The fear-model may be another case of a Marxist failing to break with the atomized model, at least in so far as the fear implies a concern for the self. In my own experience, the need to function and self-discipline for others & anger at the self, as well as pain which prompts not self-concern but self-hate, guilt, and even the annihilation of the particular self, capture the experience much more accurately. However, alienation as loss of control just as (if not more) effectively applies to these experiences. C.R. Hadfield, alienation in emergency care work.

Ferguson, Iain. “Marxism and mental distress: a reply to Shirley Franklin.” International

Socialism: A quarterly review of socialist theory. Issue 161. January 2, 2019. <http://isj.org.uk/marxism-and-mental-distress-a-reply-to-shirley-franklin/>.

S. Ferguson responds to Franklin’s criticism of his recent book, Politics of the Mind, arguing that Franklin mischaracterizes his book when she accuses him of polarizing biomedical and social models (he tries to synthesize them), overreads his work on the importance of understanding social causes as a sufficient solution, provides a crude reading of his technical and structural critiques of psychiatric medicine.

R. Politics of the Mind may be a useful text to read if I need further examples of the ‘tidal-lock relationship’ between Marxism and neoliberalism re the atomized self, in which case this response could be a helpful clarification.

Thorn, Oliver. “Why do I Hate My Self,” Philosophy Tube. August 3, 2018.

S. Drawing on Critchley’s Infinitely Demanding and Du Bois’ The Souls of Black Folk, Thorn presents the idea of the split self--that is, an experienced self and an external,”ideal self.” He further argues that while one cannot (or at least should not) get rid of the ideal self, it can be temporarily muted through art. More generally, through therapeutic and social interventions the ideal self can be recreated with better ideals and one can attain a more positive, safer relationship (integration?) with it. See also “What is Solitary Confinement Like?” by Thorn.

R. The closest theoretical intervention Thorn makes to my own is the idea that one’s ideals may be bad for oneself--that they may not take one’s needs into account or even exclude oneself entirely. (See my notes elsewhere on the tragic nature of the Will Towards Meaning.) However, even with the reliance on DuBois’ Thorn has little emphasis on two-ness, that the ideal self may be the one through which the world is experienced--instead, the veil is presented as an intrusion, a pressure, a bad (but necessary) signal. Thus, my intervention is to take, if not more seriously, then at least more literally DuBois’ description of the sensation of two-ness.

Du Bois, W. E. B. The Souls of Black Folk. Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Co.; [Cambridge]:

University Press John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, U.S.A., 1903; Bartleby.com, 1999.

S. DuBois describes the “spiritual world” inhabited by African Americans in the US during the Jim Crow period, producing an affectively powerful work drawn from sociology, economics, memoir, and applied metaphysics. Of particular relevance is his writing on the sensation of “being a problem,” the Veil and double-consciousness (Forward, Chapter 1); the irreducibility of racism to class analysis & the problem of dignity (Chapter 3); and the optimistic nihilism in “The Coming of John” (Chapter 13). In a movement that would later be echoed by Fanon and King, DuBois brings Hegelian dialectical thought to bear on the psychological effects of racism (though without yet positing race as a social construct per se) and, in doing so, clearly illustrates the political relations which shape (and, in DuBois’ telling, outright produce) the experience of the multiplicity of the self.

R. DuBois articulation of double consciousness--especially the schoolhouse scene, which captures the exaltation of pain and anger of being an Other, even to one’s own ideals--remains one of the clearest parallels I’ve found to the factional experience of depression, trauma, mixed states, and self-harm. In drawing on his model, I would argue that the fact he does not universalize this experience but grounds it in a specific social trauma does not necessarily limit the connections it invites theorists to make, but merely highlights that any such metaphysical intervention must be understood as a form inseparable from the specific system or moment of trauma it organizes and arises from, whether it arises from the machinations of imperialism, heteropatriarchy, capitalism, or even illness or injury.

Wolfenstine, Eugene V. Psychoanalytic-Marxism: Groundwork. Guilford Press, 1993.

S. Wolfenstein sets out to establish the basis for a unity of the Marxist and Freudian schools of thought, in order to create bifocal view of the world on the bases of their shared empiricism, phenomenological and critical orientations, and dialectical (anti-positivist) natures. He outlines the obstacles to such a project and reviews previous forays into psychoanalytic Marxism before introducing his own model, a comprehensive synthesis of which I still need to develop.

R. The book serves as both a source on the means by which Marxism can be brought into conversation with interiority and an object of analysis and criticism. Wolfenstein both reviews and contributes to the Marxist side of the Marxist/neoliberal psychiatric debates which tend to view the dynamics of mental illness as a means of self-righting the internal structure, whether through the re-processing of difficult information or structurally-disruptive stimuli or as a means of seeking social support, but rarely or never as a socially orientated subject.

Sartre, Jean-Paul. Search for a Method.

S. In a wide ranging essay ranging across such disciplines of history, psychology, (meta)philosophy, and revolutionary theory, Sartre takes contemporary Marxism to task for having grown stratified and dogmatic and urges it to undergo (what he presents as natural and necessary) synthesis with Existentialism. Key interventions include hegemonic philosophy-becoming-world; dialectics of materialism and idealism; the use of totalizations (mereology) as opposed to inwardly collapsing bad-totalizations (dialectic monism?); a critique of Marxism and psychoanalysis for operating only at the level of social forces and psychological archetypes, as opposed to individual life-histories, respectively; & the intersection of knowledge-of- and being-conscious.

R. The emphasis on totalizations (and totalizations of totalities) early in the essay and the knowledge/being relation found later may be useful guiding principles in developing my own method, but I think I’ll need to re-read the text before fully grasping its argument, much less its relevance to my own work.

Stout, Martha. The Myth of Sanity: Divided Consciousness and the Promise of Awareness.

S. Stout seeks to destabilize the dichotomy between the normal, unitary self and Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID). She explains that dissociation is a common tool used to avoid overloading the consciousness with overwhelming or non-integrative information, and that trauma involves increases the degree of intensity and frequency of dissociation to the point of maladaptation. Drawing on broad case history, she discusses being aware of being other people (the observing ego), treatment techniques, and an ethics-based, empirical ontology of the “soul.”

R. While the “observing ego” is a helpful tool for clarifying the schema of the divided self and the empirical ethics/ontology is interesting and potentially useful, Stout’s text is limited by her utter failure to engage theorists of the split self (Hegel, DuBois, Fannon, Levinas). She also fails to challenge the notion of an immediately-self interested self and more or less takes the idea of an atomized self, or at least the reduction of dissociation as her goal.

Fisher, Mark. Capitalist Realism: Is there No Alternative?

S. Drawing on a wide range of theorists (most especially Marx, Lacan, & Žižek), Fisher seeks to understand the state of what he describes as “capitalist realism,” the state wherein much of the contemporary political imagination has become bound up within the horizons of (free-market) capitalism. He goes beyond the rise of Reaganism-Thatcherism and its subsumption of most center-left parties to the areas of culture not mundanely thought of as political, performing a sort of social psychoanalysis. but examines such diverse phenomena as the rise of a “business ontology” in academia, decentralized bureaucracy, “Market Stalinism” and PR, and the mental illness epidemic, the later being attributable, in his analysis, entirely to the forces of Capital.

R. One of the most popularly-read psychoanalytic Marxists, Fisher’s name is something of a synecdoche for Marxist theorists of mental illness. Without joining the anti-psychiatric school, he embraces the capitalism-as-aetiology position. For example, he argues that bipolar disorder is the “disease proper to [the interior of capitalism],” links attention deficit disorders with mass-media and economic precarity, and configures the reduction of life to the profit/debt-motive as a kind of depression. Most prescient for my work, he discusses the ability of capital to effect various kinds of divisions within the subject. Major shortcomings in Fisher’s work include his class-reductionism and his lack of grounding--most of his arguments for causation appear grounded in anecdote or media, with little empirical research or personal narrative.

American Psychiatric Association: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth

Addition. Arlington, VA, American Psychiatric Association, 2013. “Nonsuicidal

Self-Injury,” pages 783, 803-806, “Borderline Personality Disorder,” pages 646-649,

663-666, & “Dissociative Identity Disorder” 291-298, 812.

S. “Nonsuicidal Self-Injury” is a proposed condition in the most recent addition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-V): at this time, it is not a clinical diagnosis, but rather an area requiring research. Criteria include having “engaged in intentional self-inflicted damage on the surface of [one’s] body” in such a way that is not anticipated as likely to lead to death. To qualify, such activities must not be “socially sanctioned” or limited to minor acts of harm (e.g. picking a scab). Behavior is expected to lead to a “positive state,” “relief from a negative state,” or to “resolve an interpersonal difficulty;” it is frequently closely connected to “self-punishment,” relief-achieving dynamics, but may also be motivated by “positive reinforcement” of external intervention or “negative reinforcement” in the form of “affect regulation” or distraction from “distressing [including suicidal] thoughts.”

R. Several surprising findings: (1) the description implicitly anticipates certain objections to the “nonsuicidal” label, noting that such behaviors may be linked to suicidal ideation and attempts. (2) It also retains a wide theory of causation, including “affect regulation,” but also interpersonal dynamics of the contagion theory and positive-reinforcement. (3) Most suprisingly, the punitive dynamic is not limited to negative reinforcement, but may be understood as a strictly retributive motivation; one could imagine this easily expanded to a more general self-orientated malicious motivation. Either way, this framework implies a profoundly non-atomized/interested subject. See also: Borderline Personality Disorder.

S. “Borderline Personality Disorder” (Cluster B) has a long-standing correlation with self-harm. It is characterized by “instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, and marked by impulsivity…”. It is further characterized by five or more of the following (1) fear of “abandonment,” (2) “unstabilze and intense...relationships,” (3) “unstable...sense of self,” (4) dangerous “impulsivity,” (5) “recurrent suicidal...or self-mutilating behavior,” (6) “affective instability,” (7) “feelings of emptiness,” (8) “difficulty controlling anger,” (9) and paranoia or dissociation. Closely correlated with sexual abuse, depression, bipolar, ptsd, and ADHD.

R. Important to mention BPD when discussing the historical pathologizing of DSH. There may also be an important made to the divided self and the unstable self.

S. “Dissociative identity disorder[‘s defining feature] is the presence of two or more distinct personality states or experience of possession” not otherwise explicable by cultural, religious, or imaginative practices, often linked with dissociative amnesia. Highly comorbid with “depression, substance abuse, self-injury,” and traumatic experiences, the disorder is often linked to survival techniques to survive and react to trauma--in the later case, memories of the traumatic event may be limited to flashbacks.

R. Though linked with DSH and possibly of co-illuminative with (Freudian?) theories of trauma (see Beyond the Pleasure Principle) Schmit’s theory of exceptionality, substantive engagement with DID may fall outside of the reasonable scope of this project.

Brighouse, Harry. “Can Justice as Fairness Accomodate the Disabled?” Social Theory and

Practice, Vol. 27, No. 4, Special Issue: Embodied Values, Philosophy and Disabilities.

October 2001.

S. Beyond a more of less obvious application of Rawls’ theory of justice to the issue of disability (see 544-546), Brighouse’s entire paper may be summarized as [concerned ableist grunts; occasional high pitched insufferable squeels regarding organ harvesting]. His interest in the subject is utterly orientated to finding defensible limits to ethical obligations; there is no hint that he has ever engaged with existentialist problematics or the infinite demands found in Levinas (see Infinitely Demanding.) Decrying ad hoc solutions to entrenched ethical problems, he nonetheless embraces such mechanisms with so little self-awareness it leaves the reader breathless (and not a little tempted to apply test Brighouse himself against Rawls’ moral powers criteria, see 547, 550) His engagement with mental disability, such as it is, only reinforces the idea that mental illness cannot be thought through as a question of justice.

R. Brighouse’s description of the original position as defined by ability is at least helpfully self-confessional (544, 546, 559). See especially, however, his failure to understand knowledge as constitutive of, rather than contained by, the subject on pg. 546, an essential problem of the Original Position (and sympathetic ethics more generally) elucidated by mental illnesses, especially those relating to knowledge- and value-production.

Critchley, Simon. Infinitely Demanding.

S.

R.

Schmidt, Karl. Political Theology.

Foucualt, Michelle. Madness And Civilization: A History Of Insanity In The Age Of Reason. New

York, NY : Vintage Books 1988, c1965. Print.

S. Tracing the history of madness from the late medieval period to the twentieth century, Foucualt synthesizes a broad spectrum of knowledge (including warrants and charters, medical treatises, hospital and employment records, theologicals, plays) in order to trace a comprehensive history of Western “madness” and “mental illness” in the Modern period, attending not only with respect to the shifting content these terms designate, but the evolving role they play ideologically.

Fanon, Franz. Black Skin, White Masks. “Chapter 5: Lived Experience.”

Viking/Penguin Books, 2001.

Jackson recommendations:

Frantz Fanon, R.D. Laing, Erich Fromm, David Cooper, Felix Guattari

https://quillette.com/2019/02/21/what-my-days-as-a-marxist-taught-me-about-modern-political-cults/

https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/michaelrosen/files/the_marxist_critique_of_morality_and_the_theory_of_ideology.pdf

https://www.nyu.edu/projects/ollman/docs/vision_of_communism.php

https://mises.org/wire/karl-marx-and-marxism-two-hundred

https://aeon.co/essays/how-marxism-and-buddhism-complement-each-other

http://isj.org.uk/marxism-and-mental-distress-a-reply-to-shirley-franklin/

https://www.marxist.com/self-harm-suicide-and-capitalist-alienation.htm

http://oldsite.english.ucsb.edu/faculty/janmohamed/Psychoanalytic-Marxism.pdf

Black skin, white masks

Infinitely Demanding

IPA: See bibliography of Hadfield, Jo., “Analysis of Accident and Emergency...”

History of Patch Adams hospital

Bechara A. The Neurology of social cognition. Brain: A Journal of Neurology. 2002; 125 (8):

1673-1675. [PubMed: 12135960]

Pickersgill M. Between soma and society: Neuroscience and the ontology of psychopathy.

BioSocieties. 2009;4:45-60.

Rose N. “The Death of the Social? Re-figuring the Territory of Government.” Economy and

Society. 1996;25(3):327-365.

Leys R. “How did Fear Become a Scientific Object and What kind of Object is it?”

Representations. 2010;110:66-104.

Hacking, Ian. “Making up People.” Beyond the Body Proper: Reading the Anthropology of

Material Life. Durham, NC: Duke University Press; 2007. Pp. 150-163.

Sedgewick, Peter. Psychopolitics.

6 myths https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4959824/

the diagnosis https://jdc.jefferson.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1370&context=jeffjpsychiatry

triggers https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6132594/

controversial diagnosis https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2719457/

Anti-psichiatry

The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct

The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness

Ideology and Insanity: Essays on the Psychiatric Dehumanization of Man

Everyday Ethics: Voices from the Front Line of Community Psychiatry

//

Chapter 4 of On LIberty, Chapter 2 of Capitalism and Freedom